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Why do great powers with benign intentions end up fighting each other in wars
they do not seek? We utilize an incentivized, two-person “Preemptive Strike Game”
(PSG) to explore how the subjective perception of great power interdependence
shapes defensive aggression against persons from rival great powers. In Study 1,
college students from the United States (N = 115), China (N = 106), and Japan
(N = 99) made PSG decisions facing each other. This natural experiment revealed that
Chinese and Japanese participants (a) made more preemptive attacks against each
other and Americans than against their compatriots, and that (b) greater preexisting
perceptions of bilateral competition increased intergroup attack rates. In Study 2,
adult Americans (N = 127) watched real CNN expert interviews portraying United
States–China economic interdependence as more positive or negative. This randomized
experiment revealed that the more positive portrayal reduced preemptive American
strikes against Chinese (but not Japanese), while the more negative portrayal amplified
American anger about China’s rise, increasing preemptive attacks against Chinese. We
also found, however, that preemptive strikes were primarily defensive and not offensive.
Interventions to reduce defensive aggression and promote great power peace are
discussed.
Keywords: great power conflict, social interdependence, preemptive strikes, international relations, political
psychology
INTRODUCTION
“The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking
anticipatory action to defend ourselves. . .”
The National Security Strategy of the United States (National Security Council, 2006).
The specter of great power conflict hovers over the 21st Century. The rise of China as a
regional and global power has unsettled other great powers. In East Asia, Japanese Prime Minister
Shinzo Abe has argued that Sino-Japanese relations today parallel Imperial Germany’s early 20th
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Century challenge to Great Britain, which precipitated World
War I (Perlezjan, 2014). United States President Donald Trump
and his foreign and economic policy team (e.g., Navarro, 2015)
appear to maintain similarly sinister views of China’s rise.
American scholars, meanwhile, fret that a possible United States–
China power transition increases the risk of another United
States–China war (Allison, 2015). For their part, influential
Chinese pundits (e.g., Yan, 2015) trumpet a zero-sum view of
great power relations today.
Spread through the mass media, such pessimistic depictions
of great power relations today create a psychological context
that undermines international cooperation. Specifically, when
people are led to believe that great power relations are inherently
competitive, they are more likely to expect people from rival
countries to be hostile, and take preemptive action to defend
themselves.
This psychology of preemptive strikes is consequential. There
is little reason to believe that elite foreign policy makers are
immune to it. Political elites, furthermore, must be responsive
to the psychological states of their national publics to maintain
the legitimacy of their governments. And elites are not the only
people who can kindle conflict. Great power war can be sparked
by small-scale conflicts initiated by a local military commander’s
overreaction to perceived threat. Regrettably, however, there does
not appear to be much research examining the psychological
drivers of preemptive violence in the context of real-world
international affairs. In the current study, we investigate this issue
by conducting micro-level behavioral experiments.
SECURITY DILEMMA, PREEMPTIVE
STRIKES, AND GREAT POWER
CONFLICT
Great power relations are central to the study of international
relations (IR). Regrettably, mainstream IR theories largely
dismiss the possibility of great power cooperation. For power
transition theorists (e.g., Organksi and Kugler, 1980), both
Imperial Germany and China today are best understood as
“revisionist” rising powers on a warpath. They argue that in a
Hobbesian, dog-eat-dog world, great power competition leads
inevitably to conflict. For “security dilemma” theorists (e.g.,
Jervis, 1978), great power relations are not necessarily zero-
sum, but are nonetheless fraught with danger. States may act to
defensively “balance” against perceived threats by building their
militaries or making alliances. But other states will tend to fear
such policies, leading them to take similar “defensive” measures.
This can lead to arms races, spirals of insecurity, and “tragic” wars
like World War I that no one wanted.
Supporting the idea of the security dilemma, recent
evolutionary and psychological research strongly suggests
that humans are motivated to defend themselves against
attack (Rusch, 2013; De Dreu et al., 2016). Such defensive
aggression can be anticipatory (Yamagishi and Mifune, 2016).
For instance, in our interpersonal relationships, we sometimes
strike preemptively to eliminate the risk of being harmed
(Simunovic et al., 2013; Halevy, 2017). For instance, a person
may break up with a partner they prefer to stay with purely out
of fear that their partner will break up with them first. In such a
situation, there are no winners.
Preemptive strikes are also a defensive tactic in intergroup
relations (Böhm et al., 2016), and specifically IR. “If we wait for
threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long,” Bush
(2002) warned United States Army cadets in 2002. Americans
must “be ready for preemptive action when necessary to defend
our liberty and to defend our lives.” The Bush Doctrine of
preemptive strikes contributed to the United States decision to
invade Iraq in 2003 to eliminate the perceived threat of Saddam
Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD; Record, 2003),
which were never proven to have existed. Similarly, defensive
preemptive aggression is a likely cause of future United States–
China, China-Japan, and other great power conflict in the 21st
century.
Will China’s rise and/or a security dilemma precipitate great
power conflict in the 21st century? With their structural and
distal focus, power transition and security dilemma theories in
IR tell us little about the micro-level psychological mechanisms
of defensive fear that may act as the proximate cause of great
power wars. And while experimental psychological research
on intergroup aggression is better equipped to make causal
arguments about the drivers of individual behavior, it has largely
relied upon artificial groups (i.e., minimal groups; Tajfel, 1970),
seldom examining real-world conflicts. This project seeks to
fill this research gap, exploring the psychological drivers of the
defensive aggression that can lead to great power war in the 21st
Century.
PERCEIVED OUTCOME
INTERDEPENDENCE AND DEFENSIVE
PREEMPTIVE AGGRESSION
To explore the psychological drivers of preemptive strikes
between persons from rival countries, we build on social
interdependence theory (e.g., Deutsch, 1985; for a review, see
Johnson, 2003). It maintains that how people perceive socially
interdependent situations shapes their choices to cooperate
or compete (Halevy et al., 2012a). When people in an
interdependent relationship believe that their interests and goals
are aligned (positive outcome interdependence), they may have
more benign expectations of each other and be more willing
to cooperate; when they believe that their interests and goals
are discordant (negative outcome interdependence), they may
have more malicious expectations about each other and be more
inclined to compete. Importantly, great power relations often
involve “mixed-motive” situations (Komorita and Parks, 1995)
where both parties have motivations to both cooperate and
compete (see also Halevy et al., 2006). War or peace thus critically
depends upon how the citizens and leaders of great powers
perceive their interdependence.
Extant behavioral and psychological research on preemptive
strikes at the interpersonal level has revealed that greater
perceived risk of being attacked increases the frequency of
preemptive attacks, while the feeling of hope decreases strike rates
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(Halevy, 2017). At the intergroup level, preemptive strikes even
occur between artificial groups (Böhm et al., 2016; cf. Mifune
et al., 2017), consistent with the tendency for people to maintain
schema-based outgroup mistrust, expecting them to be more
competitive, dishonest, and even hostile than individuals (Insko
and Schopler, 1998). We suspect that the subjective perception
of intergroup relations plays a critical role in evaluating the
likelihood and severity of out-group threat, and subsequent
decisions to engage in preemptive defensive aggression. In two
studies based on a two-person, incentivized decision task, the
Preemptive Strike Game (PSG; Simunovic et al., 2013), we
explore how perceived great power relations shape defensive
preemptive aggression between citizens of those great powers.
STUDY 1
We designed a three-country natural experiment to examine
preemptive strikes between American (N = 115), Chinese
(N = 106), and Japanese college students (N = 99). We
predicted that preemptive strikes would be more pronounced
in the intergroup than intragroup context (hypothesis 1),
and that preexisting subjective perceptions of the nature of
bilateral great power interdependence (positive/cooperative vs.
negative/competitive) would shape the frequency of preemptive
strikes against participants from the other nations (hypothesis 2).
We also hypothesized that preexisting national stereotypes would
drive aggression (hypothesis 3). According to the stereotype
content model (SCM; Fiske et al., 2007), the degree of threat
posed by another social group is assessed based upon its
perceived intentions (warmth) and strength (competence). These
socially conditioned stereotypes, therefore, should also shape the
frequency of preemptive strikes. Lastly, we implemented further
measures to explore whether any preemptive strikes taken were
more defensively or offensively driven.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Participants were recruited from an American (Mid-Atlantic
region), a Chinese (Southeastern region), and two Japanese
(Tokyo area) universities. They were undergraduates enrolled
in psychology courses, participated voluntarily (with written
consent), and received monetary compensation. Sample sizes
were decided prior to data collection, based on prior power
analyses (small to medium effect sizes expected; power ≥ 0.80)
and funding.
One hundred and twenty-one American participants
completed our experiment. Six were excluded for failing to
understand the PSG rules (they failed to recall the correct pay-off
rules in the post-PSG questionnaire). One hundred and fifteen
American participants (52% male) were therefore included in the
final analyses. Their ages ranged from 18 to 29 (M = 18.99 years,
SD= 1.22), and they came from 13 U.S. States.
One hundred and twenty-one Chinese participants completed
our experiment. Fifteen were excluded for failing to understand
the PSG rules. As a result, 106 Chinese participants (34% male)
were included in the final analyses. Their ages ranged from 18 to
25 (M = 19.52 years, SD= 1.04), and they came from 17 Chinese
provinces.
One hundred and two Japanese participants completed our
experiment. Three were excluded for failing to understand the
PSG rules. Ninety-nine Japanese participants (50% male) were
therefore included in the final analyses. Their ages ranged from
18 to 23 (M = 19.19 years, SD = 1.31), and they came from 27
Japanese counties.
Importantly, gender did not shape preemptive strike rates
(ps > 0.250) in any country; the disparity of gender composition
in the three national samples should not, therefore, affect our key
findings. We also compared results with or without excluding
participants who had not understood the task; the major findings
remained robust.
Materials and Procedures
Participants completed a survey online 1 week prior to the PSG
experiment. It assessed their preexisting perceptions about the
two bilateral relationships that included their own country, their
preexisting national stereotypes of the American, Chinese, and
Japanese people, as well as other personality and demographic
variables of interest. One week later, participants came to the
laboratory and completed the PSG experiment. They also filled
out a post-experiment survey tapping into the drivers of their
PSG decisions. The original survey and experimental materials
were written in English and translated into Chinese and Japanese
by bilingual researchers.
Pre-PSG Survey
Preexisting perceptions of bilateral relations
Participants were asked to report how they viewed bilateral
relations between their own country and the other two countries.
Items included perceived competition (“Do you see the following
bilateral relations as more competitive or cooperative?” 1 = Very
competitive, 7 = Very cooperative), likelihood of future military
conflict (“How likely is a military conflict between [your country]
and the following countries in the next 10 years?” 1 = Very
unlikely, 7 = Very likely), and optimism about future bilateral
relations (“Do you feel more pessimistic or optimistic about the
future of the following bilateral relations?” 1 = Very pessimistic,
7 = Very optimistic). Perceived competition was reverse coded
such that higher scores indicate greater competition between the
two countries.
National stereotypes
Participants reported their general impressions of people from
the United States, China, and Japan, including perceived
warmth and competence. Specifically, participants rated to what
extent Americans, Chinese, and Japanese possess 6 traits on
a 7-point Likert scale (1 = Not at all, 7 = Very much).
Trait adjectives, validated in previous research (Chen et al.,
2016), assessing warmth included likeable, friendly, and nice;
adjectives assessing competence included competent, intelligent,
and capable. Adjective order was randomized. Cronbach’s alphas
for each measure ranged from 0.84 to 0.90 in the American
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sample, from 0.81 to 0.89 in the Chinese sample, and from 0.66
to 0.88 in the Japanese sample (only the alpha for the perceived
warmth of Japanese people themselves was below 0.70). Average
scores across the adjectives for warmth and competence were
therefore calculated.
Bivariate correlations between warmth and competence for
each national target ranged from 0.24 to 0.53 in the American
sample, from 0.51 to 0.58 in the Chinese sample, and from 0.24
to 0.33 in the Japanese sample. These correlations were small to
moderate, suggesting that warmth and competence were related
but distinct.
PSG Lab Experiment
We used Qualtrics survey software to program and administer
the experiment in all three languages and countries. Participants
completed PSG tasks privately in cubicles. Upon arrival, they
received cash for participation (United States: 4 dollars; China:
14 yuan; Japan: 300 yen).1 Participants were also informed that
they might receive additional cash rewards depending upon their
PSG decisions.
Red-button PSG
In this key decision task, two paired participants make decisions
on separate computers. Within 30-s, each decides whether to
click a red button in the center of their computer screen or
not. Their decisions have monetary consequences: if neither
participant clicks the button, each receives the maximum cash
reward (United States: 14 dollars; China: 46 yuan; Japan: 1,000
yen). Otherwise, the participant who clicks first pays a small cost
(United States: receive 12 of 14 dollars; China: receive 41 of 46
yuan; Japan: receive 900 of 1,000 yen), while the other receives
nothing, suffering a great monetary loss. Importantly, once the
red button is clicked, any later clicks lose their effect; so retaliation
is not possible. As a result, clicking the red button is an act of
preemptive aggression, which may reflect either a defensive desire
to eliminate a perceived threat to one’s material well-being, or an
offensive desire to harm the other participant.
Following a practice session, each participant made red-
button decisions three times, facing a different participant
from the United States, China, and Japan. The sequence was
counterbalanced. In each round, a 5-s countdown (preparation
1Currency exchange rates were based on the Big Mac index (The Economist, 2015),
correcting for purchasing power parity.
time) was given before the 30-s countdown to make the red-
button decision. No personal information was disclosed about
either participant, except for their nationalities, indicated with a
national flag (Figure 1). Due to their different locations and time
zones, decisions were not made in real-time, and no immediate
outcome feedback was provided after each round. After all data
were collected, we randomly paired participants’ decisions in a
random round to calculate their cash rewards. Our procedure
ensured the anonymity of participants’ decisions.
Red-blue-button PSG
After the red-button PSG, participants who clicked the red button
were provided with an additional option to switch their red-
button decisions to clicking a blue button instead. Unlike the
red button, clicking the blue button incurs a small and identical
cost to both participants (United States: lose 2 dollars, receive
12 dollars; China: lose 5 yuan, receive 41 yuan; Japan: lose 100
yen, receive 900 yen), rather than primarily harming the other
participant. Switching to the blue button therefore indicates
defensive aggression, whereas sticking to the red button indicates
offensive aggression (Simunovic et al., 2013).
Decisions in this red-blue-button PSG also had monetary
consequences; switching to clicking the blue button could
change the final payoffs for both participants. For instance,
if a participant who clicked the red button first in the red-
button PSG later decides to click the blue button instead, both
participants in this round would receive identical payoffs, with no
one losing everything. In short, we paid participants cash rewards
considering the results of this follow-up red-blue-button PSG.
Participants made the red-blue-button decisions for each of the
three rounds in which they previously clicked the red button.
For more details about the two PSG tasks, including
the original instructions in each language, please see the
Supplemental Materials.
Post-PSG Survey
After making all PSG decisions, participants answered additional
survey questions and completed extra decision tasks.
Expectations about the other participant’s red-button
decision
In strategic interaction, the decision to cooperate or compete
in situations involving a possible conflict of interest is strongly
influenced by expectations about what the other player will
do (for a review, see Balliet and Van Lange, 2013). To better
FIGURE 1 | A stimulus for a PSG decision: the United States–China PSG. American participants decided whether to click the red button within 30-s, facing an
anonymous Chinese participant.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 4 June 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 864
fpsyg-08-00864 May 31, 2017 Time: 15:54 # 5
Jing et al. Defensive Aggression and Great Power Conflict
understand the proximal drivers of preemptive strikes, we also
asked participants to indicate what percentage of the American,
Chinese, and Japanese participants they expected to click the red
button when playing the red-button PSG against them.
Hypothetical unilateral PSG
In addition to the incentivized, red-blue-button PSG, we also
implemented a hypothetical PSG to assess each participant’s
inclinations to engage in offensive aggression against specific
others. Specifically, each participant imagined a red-button PSG
in which only he or she has the option to click the red button; the
other player cannot do anything so there is no threat of material
harm. The payoff rules were same as the red-button PSG: clicking
the red button incurs a small loss to oneself but causes the other
participant to lose everything. Each participant indicated how
likely he or she would be to click the button facing an American, a
Chinese person, and a Japanese person. The responding scale was
a 7-point Likert scale (1 = Very unlikely, 7 = Very likely). Given
that the other participant has no capability to attack, the decision
to click the button indicates purely offensive or non-provoked
aggression.
For other measures in the Pre-PSG and Post-PSG surveys,
please see the Supplemental Materials.
RESULTS
Comparisons of Preexisting Perceptions
of Bilateral Relations
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics of preexisting perceptions
of the nature of each pair of bilateral relations for participants
from each country. We performed repeated measures ANOVAs2
to compare preexisting perceptions of various bilateral relations
in each of the three samples.
For American participants, perceptions of United States–
China and United States–Japan relations differed significantly
with respect to perceived competition (F[1,114] = 11.41,
p = 0.001, partial η2 = 0.091), likelihood of future military
conflict (F[1,114] = 17.84, p < 0.001, partial η2 = 0.135),
and optimism about future bilateral relations (F[1,114] = 7.75,
p = 0.006, partial η2 = 0.064). Pairwise comparisons indicated
that United States–China relations were perceived as more
competitive (Mdifference = 0.58, p = 0.001, 95% CI = [0.24,
2For all repeated measures ANOVAs, Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used
when the assumption of sphericity was not met.
0.92]) and likely to be conflictual (Mdifference = 0.55, p < 0.001,
95% CI = [0.29, 0.80]) than United States–Japan relations.
Additionally, American participants felt less optimistic about
United States–China relations than United States–Japan relations
(Mdifference =−0.32, p= 0.006, 95% CI= [−0.55,−0.09]).
For Chinese participants, perceptions of China–United States
and China-Japan relations also differed significantly with
respect to perceived competition (F[1,105] = 4.28, p = 0.041,
partial η2 = 0.039), likelihood of future military conflict
(F[1,105] = 29.65, p < 0.001, partial η2 = 0.220), and
optimism about future bilateral relations (F[1,105] = 57.58,
p < 0.001, partial η2 = 0.354). Pairwise comparisons indicated
that China-Japan relations were perceived as more competitive
(Mdifference = 0.36, p = 0.041, 95% CI = [0.01, 0.70]) and likely
to be conflictual (Mdifference = 0.71, p < 0.001, 95% CI = [0.45,
0.96]) than China–United States relations. Additionally, Chinese
participants felt less optimistic about China-Japan relations than
China–United States relations (Mdifference = −0.84, p < 0.001,
95% CI= [−1.06,−0.62]).
For Japanese participants, perceptions of Japan-China and
Japan–United States relations also differed significantly with
respect to perceived competition (F[1,98] = 161.40, p < 0.001,
partial η2 = 0.622), likelihood of future military conflict
(F[1,98] = 113.95, p < 0.001, partial η2 = 0.538), and optimism
about future bilateral relations (F[1,98]= 70.51, p< 0.001, partial
η2 = 0.418). Pairwise comparisons indicated that Japan-China
relations were perceived as more competitive (Mdifference = 2.05,
p < 0.001, 95% CI = [1.73, 2.37]) and likely to be conflictual
(Mdifference = 1.63, p < 0.001, 95% CI= [1.32, 1.93]) than Japan–
United States relations. Additionally, Japanese participants felt
less optimistic about Japan-China relations than Japan–United
States relations (Mdifference =−1.34, p < 0.001, 95% CI= [−1.66,
−1.03]).
Comparisons of Preexisting National
Stereotypes
Table 2 displays descriptive statistics for reported national
stereotypes. We also performed repeated measures ANOVAs to
compare preexisting national stereotypes in each of the three
samples.
For American participants, stereotypes about Americans,
Chinese, and Japanese differed significantly with respect
to perceived warmth (F[1.82,207.91] = 4.72, p = 0.011,
partial η2 = 0.040) and competence (F[1.88,214.56] = 8.39,
p < 0.001, partial η2 = 0.069). Pairwise comparisons indicated
TABLE 1 | Preexisting perceptions of bilateral relations reported by American, Chinese, and Japanese participants.
United States–China United States–Japan China-Japan
Compe. Conf. Optim. Compe. Conf. Optim. Compe. Conf. Optim.
American 3.59 (1.74) 3.66 (1.36) 4.35 (1.28) 3.01 (1.50) 3.11 (1.37) 4.67 (1.15)
Chinese 3.71 (1.79) 3.75 (1.55) 4.84 (1.06) 4.07 (1.58) 4.45 (1.54) 4.00 (1.22)
Japanese 2.29 (1.25) 3.10 (1.42) 4.24 (1.29) 4.34 (1.29) 4.73 (1.48) 2.90 (1.25)
Ratings in each row are from American, Chinese and Japanese participants, respectively. Compe. = Perceived competition; Conf. = Projected likelihood of military
conflict; Optim. = Optimism about future bilateral relations. Mean scores are reported outside parentheses; standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
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TABLE 2 | National stereotypes reported by American, Chinese, and Japanese participants.
Warmth Competence
American Chinese Japanese American Chinese Japanese
American 4.46 (0.92) 4.23 (1.00) 4.48 (1.07) 4.99 (0.99) 5.35 (0.94) 5.20 (1.00)
Chinese 4.60 (0.99) 5.00 (1.11) 4.04 (1.22) 5.57 (1.02) 5.58 (0.98) 5.26 (1.03)
Japanese 5.15 (1.03) 2.93 (0.98) 4.77 (0.99) 5.14 (1.02) 4.40 (1.27) 4.50 (1.05)
Ratings in each row are from American, Chinese, and Japanese participants, respectively. Ratings in each column are national stereotypes about Americans, Chinese,
and Japanese people. Mean scores are reported outside parentheses; standard deviations were reported in parentheses.
that Chinese were perceived as colder than both Americans
(Mdifference = −0.23, p = 0.044, 95% CI = [−0.46, 0.00]) and
Japanese (Mdifference = −0.26, p = 0.004, 95% CI = [−0.44,
−0.07]). On the other hand, Chinese were perceived as more
competent than Americans (Mdifference = 0.36, p < 0.001, 95%
CI= [0.14, 0.59]) but not more than Japanese (Mdifference = 0.15,
p= 0.172, 95% CI= [−0.04, 0.34]).
For Chinese participants, stereotypes about Americans,
Chinese, and Japanese differed significantly with respect to
perceived warmth (F[1.78,187.61] = 38.65, p < 0.001, partial
η2 = 0.269) and competence (F[2,210] = 10.04, p < 0.001,
partial η2 = 0.087). Pairwise comparisons indicated that Japanese
were perceived as colder than both Chinese (Mdifference = −0.96,
p < 0.001, 95% CI = [−1.27, −0.65]) and Americans
(Mdifference = −0.56, p < 0.001, 95% CI = [−0.82, −0.31]).
Japanese also were perceived as less competent than Chinese
(Mdifference = −0.32, p = 0.001, 95% CI = [−0.53, −0.11]) and
Americans (Mdifference = −0.31, p < 0.001, 95% CI = [−0.49,
−0.14]).
For Japanese participants, stereotypes about Americans,
Chinese, and Japanese also differed significantly with respect
to perceived warmth (F[1.88,184.58] = 152.23, p < 0.001,
partial η2 = 0.608) and competence (F[2,196] = 18.60,
p < 0.001, partial η2 = 0.160). Pairwise comparisons indicated
that Chinese were perceived as colder than both Americans
(Mdifference = −2.23, p < 0.001, 95% CI = [−2.56, −1.90]) and
Japanese (Mdifference = −1.84, p < 0.001, 95% CI = [−2.14,
−1.55]). On the other hand, Americans were perceived as more
competent than both Chinese (Mdifference = 0.75, p < 0.001, 95%
CI= [0.44, 1.06]) and Japanese (Mdifference = 0.64, p< 0.001, 95%
CI= [0.33, 0.95]).
In all three countries, negative perceptions of bilateral
relations (i.e., competition and conflict, but not optimism) were
negatively correlated with warmth toward people of that country,
except that Chinese and Japanese warmth toward Americans
was not significantly correlated with any perceived qualities of
United States–China or United States–Japan relations. On the
other hand, perceptions of bilateral relations did not consistently
correlate with the perceived competence of foreigners. See the
Supplemental Materials for these correlations.
Preemptive Strikes under Each
Condition and in Each Country
Figure 2 displays the frequencies of red-button decisions (i.e.,
preemptive strikes) under each PSG condition. To test the main
effect of the other participant’s nationality, we performed a
repeated measures logistic regression (Generalized Estimating
Equations; GEE), thus controlling for individual attacking
proclivities across all three PSG decisions. The regression
revealed, unexpectedly, that the other participant’s nationality did
not influence the rates of American participants’ PSG attacks,
χ2 = 0.69, df = 2, p > 0.250. As illustrated in Figure 2,
the proportions of American participants making preemptive
strikes was almost identical across all three conditions. Consistent
FIGURE 2 | Percentages of American, Chinese, and Japanese participants striking preemptively (±1 SE) in the red-button PSG, facing a different participant from
each of the three countries. All decisions were incentivized. ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
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with this finding, a repeated measures ANOVA also found
that American participants expected a similar percentage of
other participants in each of the three countries (United States:
M = 51%, 95% CI = [46%, 56%]; China: M = 52%, 95%
CI = [47%, 57%]; Japan: M = 51%, 95% CI = [46%, 55%]) to
make preemptive strikes against them, F(1.38,157.29) = 0.28,
p > 0.250, partial η2 = 0.00.
As expected, however, the other participant’s nationality
significantly affected Chinese participants’ rates of PSG attacks,
χ2 = 18.28, df = 2, p < 0.001. Planned comparisons3 indicated
that, consistent with hypothesis 1, preemptive strikes were more
frequent in the China-Japan PSG (Mdifference = 20%, p < 0.001,
95% CI = [11%, 29%]) and the China–United States PSG
(Mdifference = 12%, p = 0.026, 95% CI = [2%, 22%]) than
the within-country (China-China) PSG (Figure 2). A repeated
measures ANOVA found that Chinese participants expected
more Japanese (M = 45%, 95% CI = [39%, 50%]) and American
(M = 46%, 95% CI = [40%, 52%]) participants to preemptively
strike them than other Chinese participants would (M = 34%,
95% CI = [28%, 39%]), F(2,210) = 14.20, p < 0.001, partial
η2 = 0.12.
Likewise, the other participant’s nationality significantly
shaped Japanese participants’ PSG rates of attack, χ2 = 23.23,
df = 2, p < 0.001. Consistent with hypothesis 1, preemptive
strikes were more frequent in the Japan-China PSG
(Mdifference = 25%, p < 0.001, 95% CI = [15%, 40%]) and
the Japan–United States PSG (Mdifference = 11%, p = 0.037,
95% CI = [2%, 20%]) than the within-country (Japan-Japan)
PSG (Figure 2). A repeated measures ANOVA revealed that
Japanese participants expected more Chinese participants
(M = 62%, 95% CI = [57%, 68%]) to preemptively strike them
than American participants (M = 57%, 95% CI = [52%, 63%])
and other Japanese participants (M = 56%, 95% CI = [50%,
62%]), F(1,98)= 4.364, p= 0.039, partial η2 = 0.04.
The Impact of Bilateral Relations and
National Stereotypes on Preemptive
Strikes
A GEE logistic regression was conducted to examine how
preexisting perceptions of bilateral relations and national
3In all multiple comparisons, p-values were adjusted based on Bonferroni
correction.
4This is a quadratic trend effect, indicating that the expected attacking rates for
Americans and for other Japanese were similar.
stereotypes shaped PSG aggression. First, the decision to click
the red button in the two intergroup PSGs (e.g., United States–
China and United States–Japan PSGs for American participants)
was regressed onto perceived competition, the likelihood of
military conflict, and optimism about future bilateral relations,
for each of the three national samples separately. As illustrated
in Table 3, for American participants, optimism about future
bilateral relations significantly reduced the likelihood of making
preemptive strikes against foreigners, B = −0.41, odds ratio Exp
(B) = 0.66, p = 0.015, 95% CI = [0.47, 0.92]. For Chinese
participants, greater projected likelihood of military conflict
significantly increased the odds of making preemptive strikes
against foreigners, B = 0.20, Exp (B) = 1.23, p = 0.038, 95%
CI = [1.01, 1.49]. Similarly, for Japanese participants perceived
competitiveness of bilateral relations significantly increased the
odds of preemptive strikes, B = 0.34, Exp (B) = 1.40, p = 0.006,
95% CI = [1.10, 1.79]. Taken together, these results support
hypothesis 2 that greater perceived great power competition
promotes preemptive strikes against citizens of those great
powers.
Second, to test the role of preexisting national stereotypes in
shaping aggression, the intergroup PSG decisions were regressed
onto the perceived warmth and competence of the two foreign
peoples. For American participants, neither warmth (B = −0.16,
Exp [B]= 0.85, p> 0.250, 95% CI= [0.63, 1.15]) nor competence
(B = −0.25, Exp [B] = 0.78, p = 0.123, 95% CI = [0.57,
1.07]) was a significant predictor of preemptive strikes against
Chinese and Japanese. By contrast, for both the Chinese and
Japanese participants, greater warmth toward the two groups
of foreigners significantly reduced preemptive strikes in the
intergroup PSG (China: B = −0.27, Exp [B] = 0.76, p = 0.028,
95% CI = [0.60, 0.97]; Japan: B = −0.29, Exp [B] = 0.75,
p = 0.002, 95% CI = [0.62, 0.90]). Perceived competence, on the
other hand, did not reliably predict intergroup PSG aggression
(China: B = −0.20, Exp [B] = 0.82, p = 0.135, 95% CI = [0.63,
1.07]; Japan: B = −0.16, Exp [B] = 0.85, p = 0.223, 95%
CI= [0.65, 1.10]). Hypothesis 3 is thus partly supported.5
Last, we also regressed the expectation of the foreign
participant’s red-button decision onto perceived bilateral
5Additional analyses found that, across all three PSG decisions (intergroup and
within-nation), American preemptive strikes were based more on perceived
competence of the other participant’s national groups, whereas both Chinese and
Japanese preemptive strikes were based more on perceived warmth of the other
participant’s national groups. This suggests some cross-cultural differences. Please
see the Supplemental Materials.
TABLE 3 | Regressing preemptive strikes onto preexisting perceptions about bilateral relations.
The decision to click the red button in the inter-group PSGs
American participants Chinese participants Japanese participants
Perceived competition 1.04 [0.83, 1.31] 1.07 [0.89, 1.28] 1.40∗∗ [1.10, 1.79]
Likelihood of conflict 0.78 [0.60, 1.01] 1.23∗ [1.01, 1.49] 0.82 [0.64, 1.06]
Optimism 0.66∗ [0.47, 0.92] 1.04 [0.79, 1.37] 0.89 [0.66, 1.20]
The red-button decisions in the two inter-group PSGs were regressed (GEE logistic) onto three perceptions of bilateral relations simultaneously. Each column reports
regression results for American, Chinese, and Japanese participants, respectively. Likelihood of conflict = Projected likelihood of military conflict; Optimism = Optimism
about future bilateral relations. Odds ratios Exp (B) are reported in the table. 95% CIs are reported in [square brackets]. ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01.
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relations as well as national stereotypes. For American
participants, neither perceived bilateral relations nor national
stereotypes reliably predicted the expected rate of outgroup
preemptive strikes (ps ≥ 0.10). For Chinese participants, greater
projected likelihood of military conflict increased the expected
rate of outgroup attacks, B = 3.40, p = 0.037, 95% CI = [0.21,
6.58], whereas greater warmth toward Japanese and Americans
reduced the expectation of outgroup attacks, B = −4.39,
p = 0.047, 95% CI = [−8.72, −0.06]. For Japanese participants,
greater perceived bilateral competition increased the expected
rate of outgroup attacks, B = 3.46, p = 0.021, 95% CI = [0.53,
6.40], whereas greater warmth toward Chinese and Americans
reduced the expectation of outgroup attacks, B = −3.45,
p = 0.017, 95% CI = [−6.28, −0.62]. In all three countries,
expected rates of outgroup preemptive strikes were positively
associated with the odds that a participant would click the red
button in the intergroup PSGs (United States: B = 0.05, Exp
[B] = 1.05, p < 0.001, 95% CI = [1.03, 1.07]; China: B = 0.06,
Exp [B] = 1.06, p < 0.001, 95% CI = [1.05, 1.08]; Japan:
B= 0.04, Exp [B]= 1.04, p < 0.001, 95% CI= [1.03, 1.06]).
Preemptive Strikes Are Primarily
Defensive
As illustrated in Figure 3, in the red-blue-button PSG, the
majority of participants ( > 50%) in each country switched from
their previous red-button decisions to clicking the blue button,
regardless of the other participant’s nationality. This provides
initial evidence that preemptive strikes in our experiment were
primarily defensive. However, we also noticed that the percentage
of participants switching their decision was greater in the
intragroup context than in the intergroup context, suggesting
some degree of intergroup bias. Additionally, both Chinese
and Japanese participants were more inclined to stick to their
red-button decisions when facing each other than when facing
Americans (Figure 3), consistent with the fact that China-Japan
relations were perceived by both the Chinese and Japanese as
more conflictual than United States–China or United States–
Japan relations. But overall, the frequency of offensive aggression
was quite low in all three countries. For instance, in China, only
15% of all 106 participants chose to stick to the red button when
facing Japanese; in Japan, only 24% of all 99 participants chose to
stick to the red button when facing Chinese.
Likewise, as illustrated in Table 4, participants in all three
countries reported low likelihoods of initiating offensive
preemptive strikes in the hypothetic unilateral PSG, regardless
of the other participant’s nationality. We further performed
one-sample t-tests to examine whether participants’ reported
likelihoods of offensive aggression against each national
group were significantly different from the neutral point
(4 = Undecided); the results indicated that the reported
likelihood of offensive aggression was significantly lower than
the neutral point under each PSG condition and in each of the
three samples (ps < 0.001; all CIs of mean differences excluded
the point of zero).
DISCUSSION
Consistent with our hypotheses, preexisting perceptions of the
nature of each bilateral relationship and national stereotypes
both shaped intergroup preemptive strike rates among Chinese
TABLE 4 | Reported likelihood of offensive aggression in a hypothetical unilateral
PSG.
Likelihood of clicking the red button when the other
participant cannot attack
The other: American The other: Chinese The other:
Japanese
American 2.50 (1.93) 2.50 (1.92) 2.47 (1.90)
Chinese 2.43 (1.60) 1.95 (1.38) 2.80 (1.92)
Japanese 2.11 (1.82) 2.25 (1.91) 2.21 (1.95)
Reported likelihoods in each row were from American, Chinese and Japanese
participants, respectively. Answers were on a 7-point scale (1 = Very unlikely,
7= Very likely). Mean scores are reported outside parentheses; standard deviations
were reported in parentheses. This question was hypothetical and not incentivized.
FIGURE 3 | Percentages switching from offensive to defensive preemptive strikes among American, Chinese, and Japanese participants (±1 SE) in the
red-blue-button PSG, facing a different participant from each of the three countries. Participants decided to stick to their previous red-button decisions (offensive
preemptive strikes) or switch to clicking a blue button instead (defensive preemptive strikes). Decisions were incentivized. Results were based on participants who
correctly identified the pay-off rules for this task (United States: N = 33; China: N = 45; Japan: N = 72).
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and Japanese college students. Importantly, we also found
that preemptive strikes were driven more by defensive than
offensive aggression. A proximal and defensive driver of
intergroup preemptive strikes appears to be the expectation of the
outgroup member’s imminent aggression. As “security dilemma”
theorists suggest, fear can lead to war (see also Böhm et al.,
2016).
On the other hand, the American college students in
our sample did not exhibit the intergroup bias that we
predicted. It could be that our sample of East Coast American
students were more individualistic, liberal, and motivated not
to appear racist than our Chinese and Japanese students were
(Henrich et al., 2010). Additionally, our American students may
view great power relations as more indeterminate than their
Chinese and Japanese counterparts. In Study 1, only American
students’ optimism about the two bilateral relationships reduced
intergroup preemptive strike rates, consistent with the role of
hope in mitigating preemptive aggression between individuals
(Halevy, 2017), as well as promoting conflict resolution between
rival countries (Cohen-Chen et al., 2014). However, such
rosy findings may not apply to older and more conservative
Americans who may perceive great power relations to be more
contentious.
In the next study, we address the issue of range restriction
of age and ideologies in our American student sample.
Additionally, Study 1’s natural experiment design prevents
a deeper exploration of causal mechanisms. The next study
further explores the precise causal mechanisms linking
perceived great power interdependence to intergroup preemptive
aggression.
STUDY 2
We designed a randomized experiment to better understand
causal mechanisms and manipulate a more diverse sample of
adult Americans’ perceptions of United States–China relations,
using real CNN expert interviews that framed United States–
China economic interdependence as either more positive or
more negative. We chose to manipulate specifically economic
interdependence for two reasons. First, it is highly salient, as
the United States media frequently covers United States–China
trade, investment, currency, and jobs, increasing the mundane
realism of our experiment. United States–China economic
relations were also a central theme of the Trump presidential
campaign, when study 2 was run. Second, manipulating economic
interdependence is plausible, as strong cases can be made either
that it is positive (e.g., vast mutual absolute gains from trade and
investment) or negative (e.g., currency manipulation, unfair trade
practices, job losses).
We predicted both that more positive-sum news reports
would decrease preemptive American strikes against Chinese
participants (hypothesis 4), and that more zero/negative-sum
news reports would amplify mistrust and anger toward
China, increasing preemptive American strikes against
Chinese (hypothesis 5). Mistrust and anger are psychological
consequences of intergroup threat (Williams, 2001; Cottrell and
Neuberg, 2005). These negative feelings are therefore likely to
promote preemptive strikes (Halevy, 2017).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Participants were recruited from Amazon MTurk’s online
marketplace for employers and workers. Sample size was
determined based on prior power analyses (small to medium
effect sizes expected; power ≥ 0.80). One hundred and forty
American citizens completed our online experiment (with
written consent). Eleven failed to pass a memory test about the
news report’s content; four failed a test about the PSG rules. These
13 participants were excluded from the final analyses presented
here. However, when we compared results with or without
excluding these 13 participants; our key findings remained
robust.
The final sample included 127 American citizens (51% male).
Their ages ranged from 23 to 70 (M = 40.24, SD = 11.83). The
racial distribution of the sample was 84.3% Caucasian American,
5.5% African American, 4.7% Hispanic American, 3.9% Asian
American, and 0.8% Native American. The sample was well-
educated, with high school (20.5%), college (66.9%), and post-
graduate degrees (11.8%). Participants came from 31 states. The
sample included 45.7% Democrats, 18.1% Republicans, 33.9%
Independents, and 2.4% Libertarians. Ideologically, the sample
was slightly liberal (M = 3.24, SD= 1.58; scale midpoint= 4).
Materials and Procedures
Participants completed a 20-min online survey. The randomized
experiment began with a practice session where each participant
made hypothetical red-button PSG decisions facing another
American. Following the PSG practice, participants were asked
to watch a 2–3 min CNN expert interview about IR. They then
answered a number of survey questions and completed two
incentivized intergroup PSG decisions.
Video Stimuli
Participants were randomly assigned to watch one of two
CNN expert interviews: one (with former Treasury Secretary
Hank Paulson) portrayed United States–China economic
interdependence as more positive, while the other (with
former Goldman Sachs partner Peter Kiernan) portrayed
it as more negative. Both video clips were edited from real
CNN reports, and were developed and validated in a prior
study (see Supplemental Materials). “Kiernan” interview clip
link: https://www.youtube.com/v/vRmXNOIEbP0. “Paulson”
interview clip link: https://www.youtube.com/v/rLKDpB7ORyk.
Perceptions of the News Report
Immediately after watching one of the two randomly assigned
news clips, participants were asked, “To what extent does this
video clip describe United States–China relations as competitive or
as cooperative?” Responses were reverse coded as 1 = Extremely
cooperative, 4 = Neutral, 7 = Extremely competitive. To control
for noise in the real world video clips, participants also rated to
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what extent they viewed the “person interviewed” as (1) likeable,
(2) credible, and (3) attractive, and the “news report itself ” as
(1) professional, (2) engaging, (3) balanced, and (4) stimulating.
The responses were on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = Not at all,
7 = Completely). The order of adjectives within each set was
randomized.
Trust and Anger Toward China
Participants then reported their attitudinal trust in various
groups of peoples (“To what extent do you trust the following
groups of people?”) and governments (“To what extent do
you trust the following governments?”), including the Chinese
people and government. Responses were on 7-point Likert scales
(1 = Strongly distrust, 7 = Strongly trust). Participants were also
asked about China’s rise: “To what extent should Americans feel in
the following ways about China’s possible rise?” Angry and happy
were presented in randomized order, and were rated on 7-point
Likert scales (1 = Not at all, 7 = Extremely). Only angry was
analyzed in this study.
Intergroup Red-Button PSG
Each American participant then completed two incentivized red-
button PSG decisions facing a Chinese and a Japanese person
(the order of nationality was counterbalanced). As in Study 1,
PSG decisions were not made in real-time. After all data were
collected, we randomly paired participants’ decisions with those
made by Chinese and Japanese participants in Study 1.6 We paid
each participant based on the randomly paired decisions from a
random round.
We also used Qualtrics survey software to program and
implement this online experiment. In each PSG round, both
participants’ national flags were displayed. Task procedures and
experimental materials were identical to Study 1’s red-button
PSG. However, monetary incentives changed: following a recent
MTurk PSG study (Halevy, 2017), all MTurkers were paid
150 cents for participating, as well as a variable “bonus”: 300
cents if neither participant attacks, 250 cents if a participant
attacks first, which also makes the other participant lose 250
cents (and receive just 50 cents). Final total payments of
between 200 and 450 cents were later transferred to each
MTurker privately via MTurk’s online platform; anonymity was
ensured.
Post-PSG Survey
Finally, participants answered questions tapping into their
motivations for their PSG decisions and about their demographic
backgrounds and personalities. As in study 1, we asked
participants to indicate how frequently they expected Chinese
and Japanese participants to make preemptive strikes against
them; we also assessed their offensive intentions in the
hypothetical unilateral PSG facing Chinese and Japanese
participants. For other measures in the Post-PSG survey, please
see the Supplemental Materials.
6It has not been suggested that stake size matters to PSG decisions. United States–
United States attacking rates in Study 1 and Study 2 are similar, also suggesting
limited influence of stake size on PSG decisions.
RESULTS
Manipulation Check
A one-way ANOVA revealed a massive main effect of
media framing on perceived United States–China competition,
F(1,125) = 192.77, p < 0.001, partial η2 = 0.61. As expected,
participants randomly assigned to watch the more zero/negative-
sum interview (“Kiernan”: M = 6.31, 95% CI = [6.06, 6.55])
viewed United States–China relations to have been depicted
as much more competitive than those who watched the more
positive-sum interview (“Paulson”: M = 3.39, 95% CI = [3.05,
3.78]). A one-way MANOVA also revealed that participants
viewed each interviewee’s personality and each video clip’s
production value differently, F(7,119) = 15.08, p < 0.001,
partial η2 = 0.47. Paulson and his clip (more positive-sum)
were generally viewed more favorably than Kiernan and his
clip (the Supplemental Materials). We therefore compared our
results with or without controlling for these perceptions of the
interviewee’s personality and the clip’s production values. It had
limited influence on our key analyses.
In addition, a one-way ANOVA found that, as expected,
media portrayal of more negative United States–China economic
interdependence significantly and substantially increased anger
toward China’s possible rise (“Kiernan”: M = 3.44, SD = 1.69;
“Paulson”: M = 2.32, SD = 1.32), F(1,125) = 16.96, p < 0.001,
partial η2 = 0.12. However, unexpectedly, a one-way MANOVA
found no significant main effect of media framing on trust in
the Chinese people (“Kiernan”: M = 3.44, SD = 1.59; “Paulson”:
M = 3.76, SD = 1.34) and government (“Kiernan”: M = 2.35,
SD = 1.31; “Paulson”: M = 2.80, SD = 1.32), F(2,124) = 1.78,
p= 0.173, partial η2 = 0.03.
Media Framing of United States–China
Economic Interdependence Influences
Preemptive Strikes
We performed a repeated measures GEE regression to examine
how the two CNN interviews shaped the rates of preemptive
strikes against Chinese persons, controlling for individual
attacking proclivities across all three PSG decisions. The
regression revealed a significant main effect of the other
participant’s nationality, χ2 = 15.35, df = 2, p < 0.001.
Planned comparisons indicated that, compared to Study 1’s
more range restricted college students, the national Mturk
sample of adult Americans made more preemptive strikes against
Chinese than against Japanese (Mdifference = 8%, p = 0.004, 95%
CI = [3%, 13%]) and the other Americans in the practice session
(Mdifference = 14%, p = 0.001, 95% CI = [6%, 22%]). This effect
of the other participant’s nationality also varied across the two
experimental conditions (an interaction between media framing
and the other participant’s nationality), χ2 = 5.40, df = 2,
p = 0.067 (marginal). As illustrated in Figure 4, after watching
the more zero/negative-sum interview (Kiernan), participants
made more preemptive strikes against Chinese than against
Japanese (Mdifference = 13%, p = 0.003, 95% CI = [5%, 21%]).
By contrast, after watching the more positive-sum interview
(Paulson), preemptive strike rates against Chinese and Japanese
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FIGURE 4 | Percentages of American participants striking preemptively (±1 SE) in the red-button PSG, facing a different participant from each of the three countries
and under different CNN media manipulations. More positive interdependence = Media portrayal of United States–China economic interdependence as more
positive-sum. More negative interdependence = Media portrayal of United States–China economic interdependence as more zero/negative-sum. Participants
completed the hypothetical United States–United States PSG before media manipulation, serving as the baseline for the effect of media framing on intergroup
preemptive strikes. ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p ≤ 0.001.
participants were the same (Mdifference = 3%, p > 0.250,
95% CI = [−4%, 10%]). And consistent with hypothesis 4,
portraying United States–China economic interdependence as
more positive reduced preemptive American strikes against
Chinese participants (relative to Japanese participants).7
Similarly, a repeated measures ANOVA revealed a marginally
significant interaction between media framing and the other
participant’s nationality on the expected rate of outgroup
preemptive strikes, F(1,125) = 3.69, p = 0.057, partial η2 = 0.03;
pairwise comparisons indicated that under both experimental
conditions the expected rates of Chinese preemptive strikes
(more positive portrayal: M = 51%; more negative portrayal:
M = 59%) were greater than the expected rates of Japanese
preemptive strikes (more positive portrayal: M = 42%; more
negative portrayal: M = 44%), but this difference was larger after
watching the more negative interview about United States–China
interdependence (more positive portrayal: Mdifference = 9%,
p = 0.001, 95% CI = [4%, 14%]; more negative portrayal:
Mdifference = 16%, p < 0.001, 95% CI = [11%, 21%]). Across
all participants, a GEE regression also found that the expected
rate of outgroup preemptive strikes was positively associated with
the odds of clicking the red button in the two intergroup PSGs,
B= 0.11, Exp (B)= 1.12, p < 0.001, 95% CI= [1.08, 1.15].
Anger Mediates the Effect of Perceived
United States–China Competition on
Preemptive Strikes
Generalized estimating equations regressions confirmed that
the effect of media framing on preemptive strike rates against
7The frequencies of preemptively striking against other Americans were also lower
under the condition of more positive media framing. But this difference could not
be attributed to our experimental manipulation, because participants completed
United States–United States PSG before watching the video clip. The different
initial attacking proclivities (as manifested in the United States–United States
practice PSG) between the two experimental conditions further justified the need
for controlling for individual attacking proclivities in our analysis (a repeated
measures regression across practice and intergroup PSGs).
Chinese participants was mediated by anger about China’s
possible rise (the unique effect of anger on intergroup PSGs:
χ2 = 4.03, df = 1, p = 0.045). Specifically, watching the more
zero/negative-sum CNN interview (Kiernan) increased anger
about China’s rise, in turn increasing the frequency of preemptive
attacks against Chinese more than against Japanese (for detailed
analyses of this mediation, see Supplemental Materials).
Across all participants, a mediational analysis using Hayes’s
(2013) PROCESS Macro also confirmed that anger mediated the
relationship between perceived United States–China competition
and the rate of intergroup preemptive strikes (Figure 5), indirect
effect= 0.15, p= 0.041, 95% CI= [0.03, 0.40] (bootstrapping was
performed 1000 times). On the other hand, levels of trust in the
Chinese people and government did not mediate the main effect
of the CNN media manipulation on strike rates; anger appeared
to play a more important role in driving intergroup preemptive
aggression than did mistrust in the context of media framing
and United States–China relations. Hypothesis 5 is thus partly
supported.
Preemptive Strikes Are Primarily
Defensive
As in Study 1, participants reported low likelihoods of attacking
other participants in the hypothetical unilateral PSG where the
other side cannot attack, regardless of the other participant’s
nationality (against Chinese: M = 2.14, SD = 1.94; against
Japanese: M = 1.86, SD = 1.62; both means were significantly
below the neutral point of 4, ps < 0.001). This also suggests that
preemptive strikes were primarily defensive.
DISCUSSION
Study 2 confirmed both that media portrayals of more
positive United States–China economic interdependence reduced
ordinary Americans’ preemptive strikes against Chinese (but not
Japanese), and that more negative media portrayals bolstered
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FIGURE 5 | Anger mediated the linkage from perceived United States–China competition to intergroup preemptive strikes against Chinese. Preemptive strikes
against Japanese were controlled as a covariate. Preemptive strike was coded as 0 = No attack and 1 = Attack. The regression involving the binary PSG decision is
logistic. For the path from the independent variable (perceived United States–China competition) to the outcome (preemptive strikes against Chinese), the regression
coefficient in parentheses did not control for the mediator. All regression coefficients are unstandardized. ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
American anger toward China’ rise, increasing preemptive
American strikes against Chinese. The latter is consistent with
previous research demonstrating that anger motivates aggressive
responses to intergroup threat (Cottrell and Neuberg, 2005). In
particular, China’s rise may be considered ethically wrong by
some Americans, provoking resentment (Rozin et al., 1999) and
aggression.
Importantly, Study 2 results also indicated that American
preemptive strikes were motivated more by defensive than
offensive aggression. Consistent with Study 1, it appears that fear
(the expectation of imminent outgroup aggression) rather than
spite was the primary driver of intergroup preemptive aggression.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
“What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and
the fear which this caused in Sparta.”
(Thucydides [431 B.C.E], 1954).
Nearly 2,500 years ago, Sparta became the dominant power
in the Greek world after defeating Athens in the Peloponnesian
War. The “Thucydides Trap” refers to the idea that the growth
of Athenian power itself made war with Sparta inevitable—
and is likely to be repeated by great powers like the United
States and China today (Allison, 2015). However, peaceful power
transitions such as that from Great Britain to the United
States in the 20th century strongly suggest that shifts in the
objective balance of power itself do not make great power
conflict inevitable (Lebow and Valentino, 2009). Instead, this
paper argues that the subjective perception of negative outcome
interdependence is a critical psychological trigger of great
power conflict. Across two experiments, we provide the first
behavioral evidence that negative perceptions of great power
interdependence promote preemptive strikes against citizens
from rival countries. Perceived bilateral competition appears
to increase the expectation of outgroup aggression, creating
the psychological micro foundation for intergroup preemptive
aggression.
Importantly, we also found that intergroup preemptive strikes
were primarily defensive, even between groups of people who
have been socialized to view their bilateral relations negatively
(e.g., between Chinese and Japanese) and to hold prejudiced
feelings toward one another. This finding is consistent with
previous research both at the interpersonal level (Simunovic et al.,
2013) and at the intergroup level (Böhm et al., 2016). Humans
are motivated more for ingroup defense than for unprovoked
outgroup aggression (Böhm et al., 2016; De Dreu et al., 2016;
Yamagishi and Mifune, 2016), and tend to avoid zero-sum
competition against outgroups (Halevy et al., 2012b; Böhm et al.,
2016). Great power conflict is therefore not inevitable, as long as
mutual fear and mistrust are restrained.
We did, however, observe remarkably high rates of intergroup
preemptive strikes (compared to intragroup preemptive strikes)
across both experiments. High intergroup strike rates have not
occurred in extant PSG experiments involving artificial groups
(cf. Böhm et al., 2016; Mifune et al., 2017), suggesting that the
sociopolitical context is a critical driver of intergroup preemptive
strike rates. Specifically, compared to when they faced Americans,
Chinese and Japanese participants in our PSGs were more likely
to attack each other and stick to offensive aggression—even when
given the opportunity to act purely defensively. This highlights
how socialization in China and Japan today about their past
conflicts and current bilateral relations, and mutual prejudices
(Brown, 2016) have increased the likelihood of another Sino-
Japanese conflict (Cociani, 2016). Geographic proximity and
greater contacts between these two East Asian powers make
the prospect of preemptive strikes between them even more
dangerous.
Theoretic and Policy Implications
Using the PSG to study the psychological drivers of the
security dilemma in great power relations is an example of
applying psychological theories (e.g., of conflict, decision making,
emotion, and social interdependence) and methods (the PSG,
natural and randomized experiments) to the political science
subfield of IR. Specifically, while describing the distal structural
factors that can lead even benign great powers to defensively
back themselves into tragic wars that no one wanted, like
World War I, power transition and security dilemma theorists
in IR have not explored the proximate psychological triggers
(e.g., the perception of social interdependence, the expectation
of outgroup offense, and anger) of defensive aggression.
This interdisciplinary project begins to fill this gap in our
understanding of the micro-level drivers of great power conflict.
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This project is therefore an example of how social psychology
can inform scholarship in other disciplines, and make an applied
contribution to the prospects for peace.
Our findings suggest that escaping the “Thucydides Trap” and
avoiding preemptive conflict between great powers depends in
part upon how Americans, Chinese, and Japanese are socialized
(e.g., via education and the media) to feel about each other
as people (stereotypes), and to view their bilateral relationships
(perceived outcome interdependence). Regrettably, anecdotal
evidence strongly suggests that media coverage in the United
States, Japan, and China today paints a Hobbesian picture of great
power competition—not cooperation. Our results also suggest
that the Chinese and Japanese educational systems may do the
same, socializing Chinese and Japanese to view each other with
suspicion.
Our results thus suggest a critical intervention: combatting
stereotypes and promoting more balanced socialization about
shared pasts and current bilateral relations. For instance,
educational reforms and greater media coverage of positive
outcome interdependence between great powers, such as of
successful bilateral cooperation and the mutual benefits of
trade, would mitigate against preemptive strikes, increasing the
probability of great power peace.
China’s rise has led to widespread comparisons to Imperial
Germany’s rise a century ago, which prompted a “defensive”
arms race and frenzied alliance building—a “security dilemma”
contributing to the tragic outbreak of World War I. East Asia
today already exhibits strong signs of a similarly “defensive”
brew of maritime arms races and alliance politics. The security
dilemma addresses distal structural drivers of war, however; it
does not examine the more proximal psychological drivers of
conflict, or specific forms of aggression like preemptive strikes.
With Donald Trump’s election as President of the United
States, in terms of leadership, similarities with the situation prior
to World War I have increased. Trump, like Kaiser Wilhelm
II of Germany, appears obsessed with respect both for himself
personally and for his country. And given his zero-sum view
of deal-making and the world more broadly (Matthews, 2016),
President Trump appears far more likely than former President
Barack Obama to preemptively attack a small rival state like
North Korea or even a rival great power like China. In January
2017, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists set its Doomsday
Clock the closest it has been to midnight since 1953, arguing that
“the president’s intemperate statements. . . have already made
a bad international security situation worse” (Hennigan and
Wilkinson, 2017). Should they similarly perceive an intemperate
and “zero-sum Trump,” Chinese, North Korean, and other
foreign leaders may themselves become more inclined toward
preemptive strikes. In a nuclear world, the lunacy of even
“defensive” preemptive aggression makes a better understanding
of its causes imperative.
Limitations and Future Directions
Our participants were university students (study 1) and ordinary
adults (study 2). It is likely that the psychological mechanisms
that we uncovered also apply to the political elites who make
foreign policy decisions and the military officers who make local
combat decisions. They are, after all, fellow citizens socialized
within the same national polities. However, there are also other
psychological triggers that may shape the preemptive strike
decisions that politicians and military personnel make. For
instance, politicians may be more driven by partisanship than
ordinary citizens. Similarly, honor and reputation may shape the
decisions of military personnel more than ordinary citizens.
Another limitation is that the current study investigates
preemptive defensive aggression in a simple two-person
situation. Interstate interactions are complex processes
influenced by both macro-level (structural) and micro-level
(psychological) factors. Moreover, decision-making in groups
has psychological characteristics (e.g., ambiguous responsibility)
that cannot be reduced to individual decision-making. Previous
research has indicated that collective group decision making
induces greater competition than individual decisions (for a
meta-analytic review, see Wildschut et al., 2003). It is thus
likely that decisions to engage in preemptive strikes made in
group contexts involve different dynamics than does preemptive
aggression between individual members of different groups.
We explored the expected rate of outgroup aggression
as a proximal driver of preemptive strike rates. However,
these expectations did not fully account for the occurrence
of preemptive aggression. Across both studies, participants’
preemptive strike rates were often less frequent than expected
rates of outgroup aggression. It is thus likely that pro-social
motivations, such as fairness (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002) and
morality (Schlösser et al., 2015), reduced aggression. On the other
hand, in some contexts (e.g., in Study 1’s Japan-China PSG)
participants struck more frequently than their expected rates
of outgroup attacks. The specific intergroup context may make
people overreact to potential threat, or use it as an excuse to
engage in what is actually offensive aggression. Future studies
should continue exploring dispositional and situational factors
that motivate or mitigate preemptive strikes.
Study 1 revealed cross-cultural differences in the drivers of
preemptive strikes (e.g., the facets of perceived bilateral relations
and the dimensions of social stereotypes). Ample evidence has
shown that cultural contexts, such as values and norms (e.g.,
Gelfand and Realo, 1999; Jing and Bond, 2015), moderate human
cooperation and competition. Future research should unpack
cultural differences more systematically to better understand
preemptive aggression in IR.
AUTHOR NOTE
Parts of an earlier version of this work were presented at the
23rd International Congress of the International Association for
Cross-Cultural Psychology in Nagoya, Japan (July, 2016), and at
the 2016 Annual Meeting of the International Society of Political
Psychology in Warsaw, Poland (July, 2016).
ETHICS STATEMENT
This study was carried out in accordance with the
recommendations of APA Ethical Guidelines for Human
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 13 June 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 864
fpsyg-08-00864 May 31, 2017 Time: 15:54 # 14
Jing et al. Defensive Aggression and Great Power Conflict
Research with written informed consent from all subjects. All
subjects gave written informed consent in accordance with the
Declaration of Helsinki. The protocol was approved by the
University of Delaware IRB, the University of Oklahoma IRB, and
Hokkaido University ethics committee.
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
YJ and PG developed the study concept. All authors contributed
to the study design. Testing and data collection were performed
by YL, AS, LB, and YJ. YJ performed the data analysis and
interpretation under the supervision of PG. YJ and PG drafted
the manuscript, and AS provided critical revisions. All authors
approved the final version of the manuscript for submission.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
The Supplementary Material for this article can be found
online at: http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.
2017.00864/full#supplementary-material
REFERENCES
Allison, G. (2015). The Thucydides Trap: Are the US and China headed for
war? The Atlantic. Available at: http://www.theatlantic.com/international/
archive/2015/09/united-states-china-war-thucydides-trap/406756/ [accessed
September 24, 2015].
Balliet, D., and Van Lange, P. A. (2013). Trust, conflict, and cooperation: a
meta-analysis. Psychol. Bull. 139, 1090–1112. doi: 10.1037/a0030939
Böhm, R., Rusch, H., and Gürerk, Ö. (2016). What makes people go to
war? Defensive intentions motivate retaliatory and preemptive intergroup
aggression. Evol. Hum. Behav. 37, 29–34. doi: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2015.
06.005
Brown, K. (2016). The most dangerous problem in Asia: China-Japan relations. The
Diplomat. Available at: http://thediplomat.com/2016/08/the-most-dangerous-
problem-in-asia-china-japan-relations/ [accessed August 31, 2016].
Bush, G. W. (2002). Text of Bush’s speech at West Point. The New York Times.
Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/01/international/text-of-bushs-
speech-at-west-point.html [accessed June 1, 2002].
Chen, F. F., Jing, Y., Lee, J. M., and Bai, L. (2016). Culture matters: the looks of
a leader are not all the same. Soc. Psychol. Pers. Sci. 7, 570–578. doi: 10.1177/
1948550616644962
Cociani, R. (2016). Is war with China inevitable? The Telegraph. Available at:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/04/18/is-war-with-china-inevitable/
[accessed April 18, 2016].
Cohen-Chen, S., Halperin, E., Crisp, R. J., and Gross, J. J. (2014). Hope in the
Middle East: malleability beliefs, hope, and the willingness to compromise for
peace. Soc. Psychol. Pers. Sci. 5, 67–75. doi: 10.1126/science.1202925
Cottrell, C. A., and Neuberg, S. L. (2005). Different emotional reactions to different
groups: a sociofunctional threat-based approach to “prejudice”. J. Pers. Soc.
Psychol. 88, 770–789. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.88.5.770
De Dreu, C. K., Gross, J., Méder, Z., Giffin, M., Prochazkova, E., Krikeb, J., et al.
(2016). In-group defense, out-group aggression, and coordination failures in
intergroup conflict. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 113, 10524–10529. doi: 10.1073/
pnas.1605115113
Deutsch, M. (1985). Distributive Justice: A Social Psychological Perspective.
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Fehr, E., and Fischbacher, U. (2002). Why social preferences matter–the impact of
non-selfish motives on competition, cooperation and incentives. Econ. J. 112,
C1–C33. doi: 10.1111/1468-0297.00027
Fiske, S. T., Cuddy, A. J., and Glick, P. (2007). Universal dimensions of social
cognition: warmth and competence. Trends Cogn. Sci. 11, 77–83. doi: 10.1016/
j.tics.2006.11.005
Gelfand, M. J., and Realo, A. (1999). Individualism-collectivism and accountability
in intergroup negotiations. J. Appl. Psychol. 84, 721–736. doi: 10.1037/0021-
9010.84.5.721
Halevy, N. (2017). Preemptive strikes: fear, hope, and defensive aggression. J. Pers.
Soc. Psychol. 112, 224–237. doi: 10.1037/pspi0000077
Halevy, N., Chou, E. Y., and Murnighan, J. K. (2012a). Mind games: the mental
representation of conflict. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 102, 132–148. doi: 10.1037/
a0025389
Halevy, N., Sagiv, L., Roccas, S., and Bornstein, G. (2006). Perceiving intergroup
conflict: From game models to mental templates. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 32,
1674–1689. doi: 10.1177/0146167206291947
Halevy, N., Weisel, O., and Bornstein, G. (2012b). “In-group love” and “out-group
hate” in repeated interaction between groups. J. Behav. Decis. Mak. 25, 188–195.
doi: 10.1002/bdm.726
Hayes, A. F. (2013). Introduction to Mediation, Moderation, and Conditional
Process Analysis: A Regression-Based Approach. New York, NY:
Guilford Press.
Hennigan, W. J., and Wilkinson, T. (2017). Scientists move doomsday clock
closer to ‘Midnight’. Trump’s comments on nuclear weapons are a big reason
why. Los Angeles Times. Available at: http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-
pol-trump-nuclear-weapons-20170126-story.html [accessed January 26, 2017].
Henrich, J., Heine, S. J., and Norenzayan, A. (2010). The weirdest people
in the world? Behav. Brain Sci. 33, 61–83. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X099
9152X
Insko, C. A., and Schopler, J. (1998). “Differential distrust of groups and
of individuals,” in Intergroup Cognition and Intergroup Behavior, eds
C. Sedikides, J. Schopler, and C. A. Insko (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum),
75–107.
Jervis, R. (1978). Cooperation under the security dilemma. World Polit. 30,
167–174. doi: 10.2307/2009958
Jing, Y., and Bond, M. H. (2015). Sources for trusting most people: How national
goals for socializing children promote the contributions made by trust of the
in-group and the out-group to non-specific trust. J. Cross Cult. Psychol. 46,
191–210. doi: 10.1177/0022022114557488
Johnson, D. W. (2003). Social interdependence: interrelationships among theory,
research, and practice. Am. Psychol. 58, 934–945. doi: 10.1037/0003-066X.58.
11.934
Komorita, S. S., and Parks, C. D. (1995). Interpersonal relations: mixed-motive
interaction. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 46, 183–207. doi: 10.1146/annurev.ps.46.
020195.001151
Lebow, R. N., and Valentino, B. (2009). Lost in transition: a critical analysis
of power transition theory. Int. Relat. 23, 389–410. doi: 10.1186/s40064-015-
1492-7
Matthews, D. (2016). Zero-sum trump: what you learn from reading 12 of
Donald Trump’s books. Vox. Available at: http://www.vox.com/a/donald-
trump-books/in/11880747 [accessed July 7, 2016].
Mifune, N., Simunovic, D., and Yamagishi, T. (2017). Intergroup biases in fear-
induced aggression. Front. Psychol. 8:49. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00049
National Security Council (2006). The National Security Strategy of the United
States. Available at: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/64884.pdf
[accessed March 16, 2006].
Navarro, P. (2015). Crouching Tiger: What China’s Militarism Means for the World.
Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books.
Organksi, A. F. K., and Kugler, J. (1980). The War Ledger. Chicago, IL: University
of Chicago Press.
Perlezjan, J. (2014). Japan’s leader compares strain with China to Germany and
Britain in 1914. The New York Times. Available at: https://www.nytimes.
com/2014/01/24/world/asia/japans-leader-compares-strain-with-china-to-
germany-and-britain-in-1914.html?_r=0 [accessed January 23, 2014].
Record, J. (2003). The bush doctrine and war with Iraq. Parameters 33, 4–21.
Rozin, P., Lowery, L., Imada, S., and Haidt, J. (1999). The CAD triad hypothesis:
a mapping between three moral emotions (contempt, anger, disgust) and
three moral codes (community, autonomy, divinity). J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 76,
574–586. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.76.4.574
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 14 June 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 864
fpsyg-08-00864 May 31, 2017 Time: 15:54 # 15
Jing et al. Defensive Aggression and Great Power Conflict
Rusch, H. (2013). Asymmetries in altruistic behavior during violent intergroup
conflict. Evol. Psychol. 11, 973–993. doi: 10.1177/147470491301100504
Schlösser, T., Mensching, O., Dunning, D., and Fetchenhauer, D. (2015).
Trust and rationality: shifting normative analyses of risks involving other
people versus nature. Soc. Cogn. 33, 459–482. doi: 10.1521/soco.2015.33.
5.459
Simunovic, D., Mifune, N., and Yamagishi, T. (2013). Preemptive strike: an
experimental study of fear-based aggression. J. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 49, 1120–1123.
doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2013.08.003
Tajfel, H. (1970). Experiments in intergroup discrimination. Sci. Am. 223, 96–102.
doi: 10.1038/scientificamerican1170-96
The Economist (2015). The Big Mac Index [Data File]. Available at: http://www.
economist.com/content/big-mac-index [accessed January 12, 2017].
Thucydides [431 B.C.E] (1954). History of the Peloponnesian War, trans. R. Warner.
London: Penguin Classics.
Wildschut, T., Pinter, B., Vevea, J. L., Insko, C. A., and Schopler, J. (2003).
Beyond the group mind: a quantitative review of the interindividual-
intergroup discontinuity effect. Psychol. Bull. 129, 698–722. doi: 10.1037/0033-
2909.129.5.698
Williams, M. (2001). In whom we trust: group membership as an affective context
for trust development. Acad. Manag. Rev. 26, 377–396.
Yamagishi, T., and Mifune, N. (2016). Parochial altruism: Does it explain modern
human group psychology? Curr. Opin. Psychol. 7, 39–43. doi: 10.1016/j.copsyc.
2015.07.015
Yan, X. T. (2015). The Transition of World Power: Political Leadership and Strategic
Competition. Beijing: Beijing University Press.
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could
be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2017 Jing, Gries, Li, Stivers, Mifune, Kuhlman and Bai. This is an
open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted,
provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original
publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice.
No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these
terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 15 June 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 864
